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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SALES - EFFECT OF AMBIGUITY IN DESCRIPTION OF LAND
EXCEPTED FROM SALE- ADMISSIBILITY OF
PAROL EVIDENCE
Plaintiff brought a petitory action to be recognized as owner
of three adjacent tracts of land. Both plaintiff and defendant
traced their titles back to a common author. The sale from the
common author to defendant's ancestor in title was first in point
of time. In it the description of the property intended to be con-
veyed was so ambiguous as to make it impossible for a surveyor
to locate the property. Subsequently the common author sold a
large tract to defendant's ancestor in title. Still later the com-
mon author and defendant's ancestor in title entered into a cor-
rection deed. The testimony of the expert witnesses at the trial
indicated that the description in the correction deed could be
interpreted as describing one of the tracts or all three. Plaintiff
acquired the property subsequent to the correction deed and his
deed also excepted the land previously sold to defendant's an-
cestor in title. Plaintiff contended that the erroneous descrip-
tion in the first deed rendered the exception inoperative; thus
plaintiff's ancestor in title took the whole tract. Plaintiff
further contended that the correction deed was ineffective to
divest plaintiff's ancestor of title to the property since plain-
tiff's ancestor was not a party to the deed. Defendant corpora-
tion contended it should be allowed to use parol evidence to
show that the property intended to be conveyed in the original
deed and more accurately described in the correction deed was
that of the three tracts involved in the suit.' The district court
gave judgment for the defendant, dismissing the suit. On first
hearing the Louisiana Supreme Court decided that the lower
court should be reversed on the grounds that: (1) Insufficiency
in the description of land to be excepted from operation of a deed
makes the exception void, and the deed conveys the entire tract
described, including the part intended to be excepted. (2) Parol
evidence to establish identity is allowable in aid of a defective or
ambiguous description only in cases where there is sufficient
. Defendant also based his case on two other grounds. He pleaded, ten-year
acquisitive prescription, which wis rejected because the court found the dee'd was
so ambiguous it was not translative of title. He further contended that since this
was i petitory action plaintiff had to recover on the strength of his own title and
that here plaintiff was attacking defendant's title. The court found the plaintiff
was recovering on the strength of his own title. See 235 Ln. 708, 741, 105 So.2d
392, 405 (1958). lwever, this was vigorously attacked by the dissenting mem-
bers of the court who felt that plaintiff was attacking defendant's title. See id.
at 747, 750, 105 So.2d at 405, 407.
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body in the description to leave title substantially resting on
writing and not essentially on parol. (3) The subsequent cor-
rection deed could have no effect on the title of plaintiff's an-
cestor, since he was not made a party. On rehearing, held, re-
versed in part. Since the correction deed accurately described
one of the three tracts it effectively conveyed that tract to the
defendant.2 Plaintiff is the owner of the other two tracts. While
a subsequent correction deed to which an intermediate vendee
was not a party cannot affect his title, subsequent purchasers
take subject to the correction deed which is part of the public
records. Parol evidence was not admissible because the descrip-
tion in the correction deed was not ambiguous. Blevins v. Manu-
facturer's Record Publishing Company, 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d
392 (1958).
Only one case was found where the question of the effect of
ambiguity in the description of land intended to be excepted
from a sale has reached the appellate courts of Louisiana. In
Harrill v. Pitts3 the heirs of the vendor sued to recover the inter-
est of their father in the community property conveyed by the
mother. They were met with a plea of ten-year acquisitive pre-
scription. To overcome this plea they contended that the deed to
defendant was void and not translative of title in that it con-
tained an ambiguous exception of property reserved by the
vendor, which made it impossible to determine what property
was to be conveyed. The court rejected the heirs' contention and,
relying wholly on common law authorities, 4 said that the excep-
tion, not the deed, was void.
It is a well-settled general rule at common law that uncer-
tainty in the description of land which the grantor attempts to
except from the operation of a deed affects only the validity of
the exception and not the instrument as a whole. If the excep-
tion is so uncertain as to be void, it will be ignored and the deed
will have the effect of conveying the entire tract described, in-
cluding the part intended to be excepted." It is said that this
2. Under plaintiff's interpretation of the correction deed it embraced one of
the three tracts, a total of 183.51 acres. This was the interpretation used by the
Supreme Court. Under defendant's interpretation it embraced all three tracts, a
total of 408.91 acres which was the amount called for in the deed. This was the
interpretation used by the trial judge.
3. 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940).
4. The court cited 16 AM. JUR. 619; 18 C.J. 347-348; Southern Iron & Steel
Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677 (1914).
5. Alabama: Moss v. Crabtree, 245 Ala. 610, 18 So.2d 467 (1944) ; Ballentine
v. Bradley, 238 Ala. 446, 191 So. 618 (1.939) ; Lauderdale v. Bailey, 236 Ala. 487,
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rule is based on two principles: that a deed delivered must have
effect, if possible ;7 and that a deed must be construed against
the grantor because he must express his intentions clearly.8 Only
one factual situation was found where there was any substantial
difference among the common law cases as to the applicability
of the general rule.9 Where in a later deed the vendor excepts
property previously sold and a dispute over title to the excepted
property arises between the vendees, some courts have held that
183 So. 648 (1938) ; Mardis v. Burns, 222 Ala. 31, 130 So. 381 (1930) ; Southern
Iron & Steel Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677 (1914) ; Swindall v. Ford,
184 Ala. 137, 63 So. 651 (1913) ; Loyd v. Oates, 143 Ala. 231, 38 So. 1022, 111
Am. St. Rep. 39 (1905) ; Bromberg v. Smee, 130 Ala. 601, 30 So. 483 (1901) ;
Morris v. Giddens, 101 Ala. 571, 14 So. 406 (1893) ; Frank v. Meyers, 97 Ala.
437, 11 So. 832 (1892) ; Arizona: Pima Farms Co. v. McDonald, 30 Ariz. 82, 244
Pac. 1022 (1926); Arkansas: Glasscock v. Mallory, 139 Ark. 83, 213 S.W. 8(1919) ; Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640 (1875) ; California: Lange v. Waters,
156 Cal. 142, 103 Pac. 889, 19 Ann. Cas. 1207 (1909) ; Weyse v. Biedebach, 86
Cal. App. 736, 261 Pac. 1092 (1927); Illinois: Higinbotham v. Blair, 308 Il.
568, 139 N.E. 909 (1923) ; Atterbery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363, 91 N.E. 475, 135 Am.
St. Rep. 342 (1910) ; Kentucky: Carr v. Baldwin, 301 Ky. 43, 190 S.W.2d 692,
162 A.L.R. 285 (1945) ; Stephens v. Terry, 178 Ky. 129, 198 S.W. 768 (1917) ;
Mississippi: Ates v. Ates, 189 Miss. 226, 196 So. 243 (1940) - Beasley v. Beasley,
177 Miss. 522, 171 So. 680 (1937) ; Nunnery v. Ford, 92 Miss. 263, 45 So. 722
(1908); McAllister v. Hones, 71 Miss. 256, 14 So. 264 (1893) ; Richardson v.
Marqueze, 59 Miss. 80, 42 Am. St. Rep. 353 (1881) (dictum) ; New Hampshire:
Darling v. Crowell, 6 N.H. 421 (1833) ; New Jersey: Thayer v. Torrey, 37 N.J.L.
339 (1875) ; New York: Shinnecock Hills & P.B. Realty Co. v. Aldrich, 132 App.
Div. 118, 116 N.Y.S. 532 (1909), affirmed without opinion, 200 N.Y. 533, 93
N.E. 1132 (1910) ; North Carolina: Bartlett v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 168
N.C. 283, 84 S.E. 267 (1915) ; Den ex dem Waugh v. Richardson, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.
L.) 470 (1848) ; Oregon: Seavey v. Williams, 97 Ore. 310, 191 Pac. 779 (1920) ;
Rhode Island: Sherman v. Arnold's Neck Boat Club, 64 R.I. 485, 13 A.2d 272
(1940) Tennessee: Kobbe v. Harriman Land Co., 139 Tenn. 251, 201 S.W. 762(1918); Harrison v. Beatty, 24 Tenn. App. 13, 137 S.W.2d 946 (1939); Briar
Hill Collieries v. Pile, 4 Tenn. App. 468 (1926) ; Texas: Waterhouse v. Gallup,
178 S.W. 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) ; Deroach v. Clardy, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 233,
113 S.W. 22 (1908) ; Virginia: Butcher v. Creel, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 201 (1852) ;
West Virginia: Harding v. Jennings, 68 W.Va. 354, 70 S.E. 1 (1910); contra:
Pennsylvania: Farrell v. Bowker, 278 Pa. 323, 123 Atl. 305 (1924).
6. Southern Iron & Steel Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677 (1914).
See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 285 (1946).
7. Cf. LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE art. 2474 (1870) : "The seller is bound to explain
himself clearly respecting the extent of his obligations: any obscure or ambiguous
clause is construed against him."
8. Cf. Aertker v. Ball, 17 So.2d 309 (La. App. 1944) ; Wolfson v. Succession
of Lisso, 6 So.2d 231 (La. App. 1942). Both recognize the principle that deeds
should be liberally construed so as to sustain rather than defeat the conveyance.
9. Some cases recognize an exception to the general rule. It is said that
the vendor may, within a reasonable time after the sale, make clear what prop-
erty he intended to except from the deed. SeeLoyd v. Oates, 143 Ala. 231, 38 So.
1022, 111 Am. St. Rep. 39 (1905) (correction not void when it could be made
certain by evidence aliunde) ; Smith v. Blinn, 221 Ala. 24, 127 So. 155 (1930) ;
Pima Farms Co. v. McDonald, 30 Ariz. 82, 244 Pac. 1022 (1926) (grantor can
cure uncertainty by selecting within a reasonable time) ; Stephens v. Terry, 178
Ky. 129, 198 S.W. 768 (1917) (grantor could cure ambiguities in exceptions by
selecting the lands intended to be excepted within a reasonable time) ; cf. Lauder-
dale v. Bailey, 2WI6 Al'a. 487. 183 So. 648 (1938) (equity may allow correction
to be given effect).
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regardless of the inadequacy of the description in the deed con-
veying the excepted property, the subsequent vendee does not
take the whole."0 In some of these cases" no reason was given
for denying application of the general rule under which the ex-
ception would have been ineffective. In some others' 2 the courts
simply said that where a party to a deed takes with knowledge
that some property sold to another is excepted, clearly he does
not get title to the excepted property, nor can the vendor convey
it. Still other cases's apply the general rule without questioning
its applicability.
The instant case seems to make it clear that in Harrill v.
Pitts 4 the common law general rule was adopted in Louisiana.
On the first hearing of the instant case the court based its hold-
ing on an application of the common law general rule, thus hold-
ing the exception ineffective. The rehearing affirmed the cor-
rectness of the rule, although its application was considered un-
necessary to decide the case. It is submitted that the common
law general rule should not be applied in a situation such as that
in the instant case for two reasons: (1) The principles on which
the common law general rule is based work against its applica-
tion to a dispute between a prior vendee of property and the
vendee in a subsequent sale of a larger tract from which the
property previously sold is excepted. (2) The problem could be
resolved by the use of recognized principles of Louisiana law,
without resorting to common law doctrine. These will be dis-
cussed in that order.
As pointed out above, the general rule that a deed containing
an inadequate exception of property reserved by the grantor will
operate to convey the whole is based on two principles: that a
10. Sanford v. Stilwell, 101 Me. 466, 64 Atl. 843 (1906) ; Wilson v. Gerard,213 Miss. 177, 56 So.2d 471 (1952) ; Oldham v. Fortner, 221 Miss. 732, 74 So.2d824 (1954) ; Bartell v. Kelsey, 59 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) ; cf. GeorgiaVitrified Brick & Clay Co. v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., 148 Ga. 650, 98 S.E.
77 (1919).
11. See Georgia Vitrified Brick & Clay Co. v. Georgia R. & Banking Co., 148Ga. 650, 98 S.E. 77 (1919) ; Bartell v. Kelsey, 59 S.W. 631 (Tex. Civ. App.
1900).
12. See Sanford v. Stilwell, 101 Me. 466, 64 Atl. 843 (1906) ; Oldham v. Fort-
ner, 221 Miss. 732, 74 So.2d 824 (1954); Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss. 177, 56
So.2d 471 (1952).
13. See Southern Iron & Steel Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677 (1914)Stephens v. Terry, 178 Ky. 129, 198 S.W. 768 (1917).14. 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940). Prior to the instant case it could havebeen argued that the language in Harrill v. Pitts was mere dictum and did nothave the effect of adopting the common law general rule in Louisiana. The in-
stant case seems to make it clear the general rule has been adopted.
1959]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
deed delivered must be given effect if possible; and that it will
be construed against the vendor. In a dispute over title to ex-
cepted property between a prior vendee and the vendee in the
deed containing the exception, an application of the first prin-
ciple mentioned above would sustain the original deed. The usual
situation15 calling for the application of the general rule arises
when it is claimed that the deed containing the exception is in-
effective because of the ambiguity in the description of the prop-
erty the grantor is seeking to reserve. In this situation, to give
effect to the delivered deed, the court must hold the exception
void rather than the deed. However, where the dispute is be-
tween a prior vendee of the excepted property and the vendee in
the deed containing the exception, the validity of the deed con-
taining the exception is not at issue. The question really is one
of the validity of the prior deed. The principle that a deed deliv-
ered must be given effect if possible would require that effect
be given to it as well as to the later deed. This is especially true
since the subsequent vendee takes with* knowledge of the fact
that there has been a prior conveyance of the property sought
to be excepted and is seeking to avoid its effect for his own gain.
The second principle on which the general rule is based, i.e.,
that a deed must be construed against the grantor, also is inap-
plicable to a situation such as that in the instant case. When
one sells a tract of land but retains a, portion thereof, he must
adequately describe the excepted property.16 If he fails the ex-
ception will be ineffective. Where the rights of a prior vendee,
rather than the vendor are at issue, the question is not one of
construing a deed against the grantor, but of construing it
against the prior vendee of the excepted property. It thus ap-
pears that-the general rule holding an ambiguous exception void,
with title to the excepted property passing to the vendee, has no
application to a dispute between the: prior vendee of the excepted
property and the vendee in the sale containing the exception,.
when title to the excepted property is in dispute.
As stated above, it is felt that the instant case could have
15. See, e.g., Loyd v. Oates, 143 Ala. 231, 38 So. 1022, 111 Am. St. Rep. 39
(1905) Darling v. Crowell, 6 N.H. 421 (1833) ; Thayer v. Torrey, 37 N.J.L. 339
(1875) Bartlett v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 283, 84 S.E. 267 (1915).
By far the majority of the cases cited in note 5 supra deal with this kind of factual
situation.
16. See, e.g., Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640 (1875) ; Carr. v. Baldwin, 301
Ky. 43,190 S.W.2d 692, 162 A.L.R. 285 (1945) ; Nunnery v. Ford, 92 Miss. 263,
45 So. 722 (1908) ; Butcher v. Creel, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 201 (1852).
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been decided on recognized principles of Louisiana law which
would have permitted the use of parol evidence. A brief review
of these principles might be helpful. An act of sale containing
a description which fails to describe any property or makes it
unidentifiable, does not put third parties on notice of the con-
veyance.1" This result is achieved because the act of sale to any
subsequent vendee purports to transfer the property to him,
and there is nothing of record to show the previous sale. Parol
evidence may not be used to prejudice the subsequent vendee's
rights in the matter.18 As between the parties to a deed, refor-
mation of an erroneous or ambiguous description is always al-
lowed.1 9 This is true whether the deed fails to describe adequate-
ly any property or correctly describes the wrong piece of prop-
erty.20 However, where the rights of third parties who are in
a position to claim reliance on the public records have inter-
vened, reformation will not be allowed to their prejudice.2'
In the instant case the deed to plaintiff's ancestor in title
specifically provided that the property sold to defendant's an-
cestor in title was excepted. 22 Thus plaintiff's ancestor in title
had notice from his own deed that a tract of land had been pre-
viously conveyed.2 At the time he acquired he was in a position
17. Cupples v. Harris, 202 La. 336, 11 So.2d 609 (1942) ; Daigle v. Calcasieu
Nat. Bank, 200 La. 1006, 9 So.2d 394 (1942); Baldwin v: Arkansas-Louisiana
Pipe Line Co., 185 La. 1051, 171 So. 442 (1936) ; Wilfert v. Duson, 131 La. 21,
58 So. 1019 (1912) ; Hargrove v. I-lodge, 121 So. 224 (La. App. 1928).
18. Myers v. Dawson, 158 La. 753, 104 So. 704 (1925) ; Lattimer's Heirs v.
Gulf Refining Co., 146 La. 249, 83 So. 543 (1919) ; Bender v. Chew, 129 La.
849, 56 So. 1023 (1912) ; Adams v. Drews, 110 La. 456, 34 So. 602 (1903) ; Sen-
tell v. Randolph, 52 La. Ann. 52, 26 So. 797 (1899) ; see W. B. Thompson & Co.
v. McNair, 199 La. 918, 7 So.2d 184 (1942).
19. Broussard v. Succession of Broussard, 164 La. 913, 114 So. 834 (1927)
Giovanovich v. Breda's Widow and Heirs, 149 La. 402, 89 So. 251 (1921) ; Leader
Realty Co. v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920); Lattimer's Heirs v. Gulf
Refining Co., 146 La. 249, 83 So. 543 (1919) ; Frantom v. Nelson, 142 La. 850,
77 So. 767 (1918) ; Coleman v. Thibodaux, 119 La. 474, 44 So. 269 (1907) ; Penn
v. Rodriguez, 115 La. 174, 38 So. 955 (1905).
20. See Waller v. Colvin, 151 La. 765, 92 So. 328 (1922) ; Sims v. Jeter, 129
La. 262, 55 So. 877 (1911).
21. W. B. Thompson & Co. v. McNair, 199 La. 918, 7 So.2d 184 (1942)
Myers v. Dawson, 158 La. 753, 104 So. 704 (1925) ; Bender v. Chew, 129 La. 849,
56 So. 1023 (1912) ; Adams v. Drews, 110 La. 456, 34 So. 602 (1903) ; Sentell v.
Randolph, 52 La. Ann. 52, 26 So. 797 (1899). See Lattimer's Heirs v. Gulf Re-
fining Co., 146 La. 249, 83 So. 543 (1919) ; Waller v. Colvin, 151 La. 765, 92
So. 328 (1922) (dictum). Cf. Reitzell v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 12 La.
App. 464, 125 So. 307 (1929) ; Central Manufacturing & Lumber Co. v. Darcantel,
2 Orl. App. 444 (1905).
22. Cf. Tennent v. Caffery, 170 La. 680, 129 So. 128 (1930), wherein the court
said that when a description referred to an earlier deed for a more particular
description of the property intended to be conveyed, both deeds must be considered
together and purchasers must take with notice and be bound by both deeds.
23. The exact wording was: "There is also excepted from Sections 39 and 40
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to demand a clarification of any ambiguity in the description of
the excepted property. Consequently as against the prior vendee
he should have been in no better position than the vendor him-
self. He was in the position of one who takes with notice, since
it was contained in his own act of sale. Thus parol evidence
could have been admitted to show what property was intended
to be excepted from his deed.
In its opinion on rehearing the court refused to admit parol
evidence because it felt that the description in the correction
deed was unambiguous. The question of whether or not a de-
scription is ambiguous is, of course, a question of fact and as
such is beyond the purview of this Note. However it may be
pointed out that the trial judge reached the opposite conclusion
as to what property the description described, 24 and the expert
witnesses were unable to agree on the matter. If the court had
found the description ambiguous, it is possible that 'parol evi-
dence would have been admissible under the above analysis.
Sidney D. Fazio
approximately 440 acres previously sold to Albert Phenis, as per private act
passed before William Renaudin, Notary Public, and recorded in Conveyance
Records of St. Charles Pariah, in Book ........ Page ...........
24. The trial judge also thought that the description in the correction was
*unambiouous. However, he concluded it described all three tracts in dispute.
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